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I. Introduction
The less developed countries present two kinds of challenge to economists. First, they invite us to develop hypotheses about how economic growth begins and about struc-· tural changes during the early decades of growth. Second, they provide a fresh terrain on which functional specialists in public finance, industrial economies, or what not cu.n test accepted notions about economic behavior.
For investigations in labor economics, the structure of earnings provides a convenient starting point. (It is best to say "earnings" rather than "wages" because most workers in the LDC's are self-employed.) Analysis of earnings requires an examination of manpower supplies and requirements. This leads into the economics of agriculture, industry, government, and other labor-demanding sectors on one side, and into a study of educ2ti<?!1 and other skill-producing agencies on the other. Thus by starting with the earni._;1gs structure, one is led rather directly into the heart of the economy.
Some readjustment of ideas is necessary at the outset in view of basic differences between the LDC's and the advanced industrial countries. Certain wage issues which are important in Europe and the United Stat~s do not bulk large in the present context. Costpush pressure on the price level, and the problem of reconciling high employment with price stability, are not major issues. The concept of income distribution as a division between profits and wages is applicable only witpin the small sector of "modem industry." The concept of a general wage level, with the implication that particular wages move in a synchronized way, is not useful. The interesting problems concern rela_tive earnings in ; -2-:if:201ent cireas. ~;;ector:::., fi:.:r:<: _ ~:.n occupations, i.e., they are problems in micro-economies.
A serious difficulty is that there is no such thing as a "typical" less developed country. The range of variatior1 is much wider than in the North Atlantic world. Consider the differences between Malawi and Mexico in income level, composition of output, skilldistribution of labor force 1 weight of government in the economy, wage-determining institutions. In most respects the countries of tropical Africa cluster toward a "least developed" pole, some of the Latin American countries toward a relatively advanced pole, with other LDC• s somewhere in between.
Admittfog this difficulty, let us examine a fictitious or 11 median 11 LDC with the following characteri sties;
First, it is a "mixed economy." Government operates public utility industries and perhaps certain branches of manufacturing in addition to producing public services.
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Second. the economy is at an early stage of development. with "modern" busir.ess enterprises producing perhaps ten percent of national output. It is neither Malawi nor
Mexico, but more nearly like Thailand, Pakistan, or Colombia.
Third, the economy is growing. i.e. per capita output is rising. In a stagnant economy, the phenomena analyzed below would not appear.
Fourth, population and labor force are growing rapidly--say, at 2. 5 to 3. 0 percent per year. There is surplus labor, or perhaps better "labor slack" in the economy, consis'ting partly in unutilized labor time and partly in wide sectoral differences in output per worker.
There is an ample supply of {untrained) labor to the growth points of the economy.
The occupational groups to be analyzed are: self-employed workers in agriculture;
self-employed workers in traditional urban occupations; low-skilled workers in "modern" private enterprises and in government; and white-collar.workers requiring some period of -3-formal education. We shall exzrnline how the ed.rn.ings of these workers are determined at a point of time, and offer hypotheses about the probable movement of relative earnings during the first few decades of development. The discussion is necessarily speculative and hypothetical, because reliable earnings data are rare in the less developed world, and are usually limited to short periods of time.
ll. Earnings in Agriculture
Vve begin with agricultural workers, whose earnings are often regarded as constituting a base for the urban earnings structure. Agriculture is a diversified industry, including many products and numerous forms of production organization. It may include large plantations, producing for export and hiring wage labor. It includes landless laborers on other farms, hired on a daily or weekly basis. It includes peasant farmers, who own or rent the land they cultivate. So we must first decide whose incomes we are talking about and what kind of agricultural organization we are assuming.
iNe limit the discussion to peasant farmers, who may be either owners or tenants. We assume that all farm work is performed by household members, and ignore the possibility of hired labor. vVe assume also a clear separation of people and incomes between country and city. People who move to ths city settle there permanently. There are no infonnal income transfers--farm people do not ship food to relatives in town, nor do town dwellers help to support rural relatives. This is meant to exclude the African migratory labor situation, in which it becomes difficult to segregate and compare "rur.al incomes" with "urban incomes.
11
It is necessary next to select an appropriate income measure. Should this be earnings per man-hour of labor, or per farm worker, or per farm household? All adult household members commonly do some work on the farm, and children begin to contribute at an early -4-age. Fc:1rm employment Js thus difficult to measure, and it is probably be st to take income per household as the most useful figure.
At an early stage of development, farm income consists largely of production for home use. This is not merely food production, but includes almost everything the family consumes--clothing, housing, furniture, personal services. Salt, tea, shoes or sandals, cloth, and a few metal tools and cooking utensils may be the only purchased items. The valuation of household production is thus of critical importance. In GNP calculations, foodstuffs for home consumption are usually valued at farm prices, so as not to include "fictitious" transport and marketing charges. But if the purpose is rural--urban welfare comparisons, or appraisal of inducements to migration, it would seem that farm production should be valued at "city prices." To the extent that this is not done, and to the extent . that a.11 items of hous.ehold production are not counted, the relative level of rural earnings is understated.
Where the peasant is an owner-cultivator, there should be a deduction for imputed
• i -rent and interest in order to arrive at labor income proper. But such adjustments are notoriously imprecise and often yield the result 1hat farm labor income is very low or even negative. In any event, gr 0 ss earnings including rent and interest may be more pertinent to analysis of rural-urban migtation and labor supply to the modern sector. One could argue, indeed, that farm income per household must rise in any event.
For suppose that agricultural output rises only as fast as population, or even at some lower rate. Rising per capita incomes in other sectors, pressing against this limited food supply, will shift the rural-urban terms of trade in favor of agriculture. Real income per farm household will then rise because of the terms of trade effect. It is unwise to rely on this as more than a short-term argument, however, because sue~ a growth path would come to an end rather quickly as the classical economists foresaw.
In the general case of successful development along a balanced agriculturalindustrial path, agricultural output per head of national population will be rising. It seems unlikely that they would be willing to do this for zero return.
V./e conclude that growth models in which the "rural wage rate" remain constant as output rises are not plausible. Instead, in come and consumption per household will move upward over time.
The rate of increase depends on: (1) the rate of increase in physical output, which
depends partly on what government does to discover and disseminate new techniques, and to make available physical inputs, credit, a·nd marketing facilities; (2) land tenure arrangements, which det~ermine the share of increments in output accruing to the cultivator, and.
which can be altered by government 1lhrough 11 land reform" measures; (3) the behavior of ·farm prices, which is often regulated through price supports, marketing boards, or other government purchase schemes; (4) But while things might possibly work in this way, they do not seem actually to work in this way. It seems in fact reasonable to draw the supply curve of labor to the modern sector (SS in Figure 1 ) as sloping upward in the usual way. Although we have spoken for convenience of an average level of earnings in agriculture, actual earnings vary widely because of variations in soil, climate, water availability, cropping patterns, and the farmer's own capacity. The wage at which individuals find it worthwhile to transfer from country to city will vary correspondingly. Moreover, the modern sector draws only part of its recruits from agriculture. Some come from other urban activities, and some are new 1 entrants to the labor force.
For these people, too, it is reasonable to suppose t!'iat the higher the industrial wage, the larger will be the number of job applicants.
The truth behind the Lewis-type diagrams is that, at the wage-level prevailing in the modern sector (OW in Figure 1 ), the number of workers desiring employment (ON) exceeds the number demanded (OE). There is a disequilibrium situation. The interesting question is how the wage OW was established, and why it does not fall in the face of a labor surplus. Explanation of this phenomenon belongs to a later section.
An increase in agricultural earnings would shift the supply-curve leftward, say to s 1 • s 1
. But this would still leave a labor surplus, and would not directly affect-wo.ges or employment in the modem sector.
1 In a sample of 1000 new factory workers in Puerto Rico, the writer found that about onefifth had trc:.nsferred from agriculture, two-fifths were drawn from other sectors of the economy, and another two-fifths were r1ew entrants to the labor force. See Lloyd G.
Reynolds and Peter Gregory, \IVages, Productivity, and Industrialization in Puerto _Ric:q_ (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965). p. 209. It would be useful to have comparable evidence from other industrializing countries.
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Simplified models of development sometimes assume that all non-agriculturalists are employed in the modern sector 1 . But this is actually not true. The urban population comprises two distinct areas of employment. These may be termed the traditional and modern areas, or the small enterprise and large enterprise areas, or the low productivity and high productivity areas.
In the early stages of development, most of the urban labor force is in the low pro- ,r,cJuding the fact that soirw Hems consumed in the city are not available in the country.
One is in the end comparing two different styles of life •.
Suppose, however, that these difficulties could be overcome. What would one expect to be the relation, in equilibrium, between real earnings in agriculture and· in traditional urban activities? The equilibrating factor would be rural-urban migration. So the question may be put in this form: what assumptions about migration would lead one t:> expect income parity between agricultural and (traditional) urban occupations?
One would have to assume that everyone growing up in the countryside has the option of remaining in agriculture (no one is literally pushed out by land scarcity); that the only alternative to agricultural employment is employment in the low-productivity urban sector (wh~ch ignores the chance to secure employment in the high-wage modern sector); that differences in real household income are the only determinant of migration {the "bright lights" and other presumed attractions of city life are not relevant); that whole households migrate; that accurate information is available, and that migration costs are zer,o. Under these conditions one might expect real incomes to tend toward the same level .in both sectors.. Any disruption of equilibrium resulting from differing rates of population growth in country and city, or from differing rates of increase in labor demand, would be speedily corrected by net migration.
Migration is clearly more complex ~han this, and we do not know much about it.
Labor market information is poor, and the costs and risks of migration are substantial. On these counts it is often argued that the equilibrium level of real income will be somewl:at higher in the city. But there are also forces working in the opposite dfrection. urban activities may be below that in agriculture. Or to put the point differently, income parity in the two sectors will lead to substantial country-city migration. This hypotheses ·can be tested, however, only through country-by-country investigation.
Vl/hatever the equilibrium income relation may be--and supposing that equilibrium is once established--changes in the earnings level in traditional urban activities should thenceforth parallel those in agriculture. If real income per farm household rises gradually over time. as we argued earlier it should do in a growing economy, one would expect a ·similar movement of earnings in traditional urban activities.
-· A word may be added on urban unemployment. In many .of the less developed countries~ the number of rural-urban migrates has recently exceeded the increase in urban labor demand, leading to growing unemployment and underemployment in the cities. While this is indeed a serious problem, one may speculate that unemployment will not increase indefinitely. It tends to reduce real incoll)e per household member in the cities relative to -12-ihat in agriculture; o.n:J. it reduces the probability 1 of new migrants being able to find jobs in the modern sector. Both effects are unfavorable to migration. At some level of unemployment, therefore, net migration will fall to the rate at which new urban jobs are being created. Unemployment will then have reached an equilibrium level, and will not increase further.
There are important policy problems in this area. Assuming that many LDC's will have substantial under-employment for some decades to come, is it better for people to be under-employed in the country or the city? Should cityward migration be encouraged or discouraged? VI/hat policy instruments are available? Further investigation of migration behavior and relative income levels might contribute to resolving such questions.
IV. The Modern Sector: Low-Skilled Labor
The modern (or high-productivity) sector embraces government service, factory industry, commercial construction, mechanized transportation, import and export trade, banking and finance, electric power and other public utilities. In some economies it includes also large mining or petroleum industries.
The wage rate of primary concern is the hiring rate for unskilled labor; but we use the broader term "low-skilled labor" to include semi-skilled operatives in manufacturing and comparable groups in other industries. These jobs require only a short training period, and are usually paid at not much more than unskilled labor rate. ---. . Second, a high-wage policy has productivity advantages, and so again costs less than it .may appear to cost. It enables the employer to skim the cream of the local labor forpe, to secure workers of relatively low age, superior physique and intelligence, above-average education, stable work habits, good scores on tests of manual aptitude.
It helps to reduce turnover and absenteeism. It enables supervisors to demand a good pace of work plus attention to quality of product and care of machines. Higher wages may also add to workers' strength and efficiency by permitting better nutrition and health care.
Third, there are less tangible but important advantages in the company's public relations. In the ideological atmosphere of most LDC' s. high profits are viewed with suspicion and may lead to demands for nationalization or heavier taxation. Foreign-owned" enterprises are especially vulnerable to political attack._ Profit-sharing through an obviously generous wage level may seem good long-range strategy.
Once a sizeable wage differential has appeared, for whatever reasons, it tends to harden into custom. There develops, in ~ sense, a dual labor market. To the extent that employers are competing, not for labor in general, but for workers already accustomed to employment in the modern sector, they may be expected: to offer what other modern-sector -15-employers are paying. This can be ratwnali z.eu partly by arguing that the productivity of experienced industrial workers is higher than that of new, untrained workers, they contain more efficiency units per man. Perhaps more significant, however, is that their wage expectations are decidedly higher as a result of their past earnings experience.
Wage levels are not deter_!l1ined simply by market pressures and employer policies.
Trade unions are typically not very consequential in the LDC's, operating mainly as political pressure groups rather than as bargaining organizations. Government wage regulation, however, is quite important. In most LDC' s the political climate is welfarist and egalitarian. The urban employees. including government employees, the university students, the writers and intellectuals are a force to be reckoned with if a (frequently) insecure government is to remain in power. Given the obviously high wage-paying ability · of modern industry, it is entirely natural for governments to pursue a high-wage policy (high, that is, relative to earnings in traditional activities, though still low on an absolute basis or relative to more developed countries).
Government policy operates, first, through the wage level it sets for its own employees. Government departments and state enterprises employ a considerable share, often 20 to 40 percent, of the workers in the modern sector. So it can, and frequently does, act as a wage leader for this sector.
The other main device is minimum wage legislation, which is widespread in the LDC's and usually exerts substantial pressure on the wage structure. Even if the initial minimum is reasonably in line with traditional earnings, there is a strong tendency toward frequent . and large increases. One can always show that existing wages are too low to support a .
• "decent" standard of life, and it can be argued plausibly that employers will somehow absorb the higher labor costs. In Uganda, for example, the minimum wage in government The effect of the minimum wage system is thus quite different from its effect in more developed countries& In the United States, for example, the federal minimum wage lags the upward movement of wage rates. When the minimum is raised ever/ five years or so, this affects only a few percent of the labor force, and serves mainly to tiC.y up the ragged lower fring~ of the v1age structure. In the LDC's,on the other hand, the minimum actually determines the earnings of low-skilled labor, and forces them increasingly above the supply-price of such labor.
Given this kind of split-level wage structure, it seems likely that the earnings gap between the modern::1 and traditional sectors will vviden over the early decades of development. An important consideration here is that value added per worker in the mode:-n, sector is likely to rise quite rapidly over time--partly through "learning" by both workers and managers which is normal in new enterprises, partly through other ty!,Jes of tech.Meal progress.
The fact that output per worker is rising does not per se provide ar..y reason for we.ge increases, since v1ages a~e already above the supply price of labor. But if wage rates were actually held stable, or at least held stable relative to product prices, profit margins would widen continuously. This is politically unacceptable for reasons suggested earlier, ·and there will be strong pressure to keep.· wages moving upward.
Earnings in traditional activities will also be rising, because of our basic assumption of agricultural progress; but they are likely to be rising quite gradually. It is thus a l See the Kr1ight and Reynolds-Gregcry studies cited previously. In Asia, the picture is mixed. Wages have advanced materially faster than output per capita in Ceylon, but at about the same rate in Pakistan, and less rapidly in India and the
Philippines. 1
It is interesting to speculate on the main consequences of this kind of wage behavior. First, how is continual forcing up of the unskilled labor rate likely to affect the earnings of higher grades of manual labor? As regards semi-skilled workers, ·there is a tendency toward compression of skill differentials. When the minimum wage is raised, workers who are only a short distance above the minimum usually receive incre2ses as well. But these are often not equal in absolute terms, and still less in percentage terms, to the increase in the minimum wage. If, however, the shrinkage of differentials reachGs the point of inte:.-fering with incentive to learn and perform semi-skilled jobs, the employer has the o:.:-tion of widening them once more. These rates are market-determined in that the premium ov.er the common labor rate must be sufficient to call forth the required supplies.
From another standpoint, since the common labor nate itself is artificial, the structure of rates above it may also be considered artificial. -18-
The wages of skilled manual workers are also market determined, and foeir premium over unskilled labor is considerably larger than in more developed countries. In Britain and Western Europe, skilled men typically earn 20 to 30 p~rcent more than the unskilled. In the LDC's, however, they almost invariably 1 earn at least 50 percent more, and quite often earn . 2 two to three times the laborers' wage.
The movement of skilled rates over time ~epends mainly on the relative rates of increase in demand and supply. In a growing economy, with considerable investment in infrastructure and industry, demand for skilled tradt:smen will be rising quite rapidly. The response of supply is lagged because of the lei1gth of the training period. In some newly-independent countries, where skilled work was formerly done by expatriates or by ethnic groups regarded as "foreign," nationalization of these jobs may also restrict supply for the time being.
On balance, skilled rates seem likely to advance rapidly in economies which are 2 see a summary of the available evidence by Berg, in the I. I. L. S. paper previously cited.
As Berg points out, however, it is not ea.sy to identify the rate for a certain cu.tegory of ·skilled labor. There is usually a wide variety of rates for any job title. One reason is that the classification itself is heterogeneou~ .. comprising some people who are truly all-round craftsmen along with a larger number with less skill and training. The gap between the laborer and the true crc:ftsmen is considerably wider than is suggested by studies which use median earnings of all those classified as skilled.
-19-but that this tendency is not as strong 01 as uniform among countries as one might have expected a priori. Of 13 LDC's for which data were available in the early 'fifties and in the early 'sixties, skill differentials seemed to have fallen in 8 and risen in 5; but in several cases the degree of change was too small to be significant in view of the crudeness of the data.
The fact that the modern sector wage level is abnormally high, in part because of non-market pressures, has other consequences which can be mentioned only briefly. The tendency for the profit share of national income to rise sharply during early development is retarded, through the transfer of potential profits to wage -earners. Investment in the modern sector may be reduced, both by a reduction of reinvestible earnings and of the profit margins which are the incentive to investment.
Rising wages may have favorable productivity effects. In addition to the possible effects already noted on workers' physical capacity there is something to the "shock effect" on management. New enterprises setting up in a country where manual labor seems very
cheap are likely to use it wastefully. Wage pressure forces them to economize labor in an effort to maintain profit margins. To the extent that these efforts are successful,· the impact on industrial profits is reduced; but the negative impact on industrial employment becomes more severe.
Wage pressure in the modem sector increases the inequality of labor income in the economy. It creates a high-wage island in a sea of agriculturalists and self-employed or unemployed urban workers living at much lower income levels. This must make it harder ,for government to apply any general policy of restraining consumption for the sake of .
• investment. Farmers or others who are squeezed by such a poli.cy can point to the rapid rise of industrial wages and demand similar :preatment.
Not unimportant is the squeeze on the government budget. A rapid rise of wages in d1e public sector means large built-in increases in the current budget, of which two-thirds or so is payment for labor services.
Suppose GNP is rising at 5 percent per year, and that the tax system has unit income elasticity, so that revenues are also rising 5 percent per year. Then if the government wage level is also rising S percent per year, it is clear first, that the numbers employed in providing current government services cannot be increases; and second, that there can be no increase in the proportion of the budget devoted to investment. The investment proportion can be increased only through some combination of: a tax structure which yields a revenue elasticity greater than one; frequent imposition of new taxes so that, even if the elasticity of existing taxes is less than one, revenues will still rise faster than GNP; a rate of increase in government salary scales below the rate of GNP increase; or a reduction of current services. The less the succ'=!sS on the wage front, the greater the pressure on otheI fronts. In some countries wage pressure has contributed to a growing encroachment of the current budget on the capital budget, contrary to the requirement for successful development.
This leads to the employment effect of rapid wage increases. If we assume that the amount which government can budget for labor services is independent of the wage level, the elasticity of demand for labor in the public sector is -1. Elasticity in the modern business sector is harder to estimate, but must also be negative and substantial. Wage , have also increased. This may be a rather ty_!:iccl situa-· tion for high-population-growth countries during the early decades of develo;n .
• ent.
1 Greatzr detail is presented in Reynolds and Gregory, op. cit., Ch~.1-3. Strictly rr..anufocturir..g output should be valued in constant dollars. The Puerto Rican pric·= leve~. rose moderately frcr.1 1950-62, in line with that of the U.S. mainland. Even on this bc:.~t3, however, there would remain a gross discrepancy between output and employr::2nt·t.-c:ids.
2 See on tnis point Werner Baer and Michel Herve, "Employment and industric:.~izatio:;. in C.evelo.'.)iWl countries," Quarterly Tournal of Economics, February 1966, pp. 88-107. 3 Figure 2 does not show directly the number of unemployed. Some of those arrayed done t!"tc dis~·2nc8 Ez N 2 are wholly unemployed; some are partially unemployed who wort: 3. si:c«: \'.'Gek; n~ost are disguisedly unemplcyed, i.e., working normal hours but producing .::i.nd ec..:-r~-· i~g belc·N wh:it they could earn in "modern" activities. It seems plausible tha.i:, as t!:. Our explorations in this area must necessarily be brief. We consider only whitecollar occupations, and we assume that some degree of education is required for unemployment in these occupations. Initially. we shall as sum.; that there is only one grade ~£ "educated labor," characterized by secondary-school graduation. We assume also that educated labor is produced and employed wholly within the country. i.e •• we ignore the possibility of hiring expatriates, and the reverse possibility of "brain drain" losses to 1 -more advanced countries. Rental incomes are apt to be viewed with suspicion. What would happen if efforts were made to eliminate this type of rent? One might reason that the proper wage is OW 1 , at the intersection of the D and S curves, and might try to i.mpose a ceiling at this level.
The· first effect of ~his, however, would be to create excess demand of EE1. There would be competition for educated labor among government departments, public enterprises, and private industry. Unless workers could be allocated among employers, the wage line ow· 1
could not be held. Because of the time required to expand educational capacity, such overshooting is unlikely in practice. But setting educational targets is clearly a complex problem, and any target which may be selected has wage implications which are not always recognized. 1 Figure 3 assumes, that at the outset of development, educational facilities are likely to be so restricted as to produce substantial rents for school graduates. The actual situation will of course differ from country to country. There are indications, however, that large wage differentials for educated white-collar workers are common in the LDC's.
In Chile in 1960, the monthly earnings of manual workers in manufacturing averaged about ' 2 65 escudos, while office workers averaged 163 escudos.
In Uganda, in 1965, when the rate for unskilled government employees of whom no education is required was I:.90 per year, holders of a Junior Leavers' Certificate (8 years of education) were averaging 1:.204
1 The complexities, i~deed, are not fully revealed by Figure 3 . Labor quantities such as OE and ON are stocks at a moment of time. The output of the educational system, however, is a flow per unit of time. The time needed to raise the stock OE to ON will depend on the annual outp11t capacity of the educational system and on attrition rates. Since .time is required, the demand curve (and probably the wage rate) will meanwhile have shifted to a new P©sition. The problem of educational target-setting. must thus be set up albegraically with a time dimension. In the LDC' s, hcwever, tellers typically earned 2 to 4 times as much as laborers, the ratio rising as high as 5. 9 in Chile, 6. 1 in Kenya, 6. 5 in Nigeria, and 6. 9 in Guatemala. While such large differentials may contain a conventional element, they seem to be mainly market-determined, with educational supply restrictions playing a key role.
How will the prer::ium for educated manpower behave over time? This clearly depends on. the relative rates of increase in demand and supply. Even without expansion of educational facilities, E wiE move rightward if the annual output of graduates exceeds attrition through death and retirnment. But the higher the rate of expansion in school capacity, the more rapidly tl"1e stock of educated manpower will rise. The rate at which the demand curve shifts to the right cl2pends on the rate at which output is rising in the modem sector, and on their inputs of educcted labor per unit of output. The input coefficient is no doubt . adjustable, but not indefinitely; and in the public sector custom may enforce educational q: 1~a lifications for eaci1 civil service grade regardless of job content.
There is a distinct possibility tha~ the differential for educated manpower will widen for quite some time. This is especially likely in countries which entered a phase of accGlerated growth witl1 a small educational base.
Matters become more complicated ~hen one recognizes that there are several levels of educated manpower. There are primary graduates, secondary graduates, and university __ ;. Suppose, on the other hand, that without much enlargement of secondary education the proportion going on to universities is increased sharply. This will again raise the earnings premium for secondary graduates. since it reduces the supply available for immediate employment. But if the rise in university outputs outpaces the rise of demand at that level, the relative earnings of university graduates will fall. Thus it is qnHe possible that differentials for some educational levels may be widening while others are declining.
A further complication is that university education comprises numerous specialties.
Depending on training capacity for each specialty relative to demand movements, the prices of different skills may move in different directions. Relative earnings of engineers may rise while those of philosophers fall.
These complex issues cannot be pursued here, but several things should be clear.
First, future requirements for different levels of educated manpower cannot be calculated -28-independently of market prices. Second, strategy should be guided, not by the present structure of relative earnings, but by the structure as it may appear ten or twenty years hence, on the basis of explicit assumptions about demand elasticities and demand shifts.
Third, the actual move".'l1ent of earnings for different levels of educated manpower will be heavily influenced by educational decisions. Earnings structure, manpower allocation, and educational expansion are aspects of a single interdependent problem.
VI. Some Implications for Policy and Research
It is not the purpose of this paper to explore wage policy. -we may note, however, several policy issues which stand out clearly from the discussion.
(1) What is the primary function of the earnings structure in early economic growth?
TQ.is structure serves a variety of purposes. It distributes income between capital and labor, and within the working population. It provides an indicator of relative skill scarcitie· It affects ~t influences the allocation of labor to industries, occupations, and regions.
'.kers' effort and productivity. Vlfhich of these functions should be given heaviest weight in judging whether a particular earnings structure is optimal?
(2) At what rate should real income per farm household increase over time? This is mainly a matter which concerns the agricultural sector; but it also influences rural-urban migration and the earnings level in traditional urban activities. wage behavior would be optimal if it.: could be achieved.
-29- (5) What is the optimal size of the educational budget, and the ;optimal allocation of this budget among levels of education and specialized trainil)g courses? This is basically a problem in manpower economics, involving relative earnings as well as physical manpower flows? (6) To what extent can large market differentials be eroded by progressive income taxation? Can one assume that, the higher the wage or salary level. the larger the rental element which can be recaptured without affecting supply? Can one assume also that the groups involved will not seek to restore their post-tax position by a further widening of pre-tax differentials?
It should be clear also that no LDC. even if it could define objectives and had effective policy instruments. presently has enough knowledge to devise optimal policies.
The following may be suggested as high-priority research problems for any developing country:
i.
Measurement of the main dimensions of earnings structure, and of how it has changed over time. This will usually require major improvements in the statistic_s on wages and income.
ii. Farmers 1 production and consumption responses to increases in real household income.
iii. The volume: incidence, and determinants of rural-urban migration.
iv. The rr.t,,,. u.;·,L~ .aoP!C23 e;; prc-.iuctivity increase i_n the modern sector, including -~1.e roli.:: of wages and the implications for employment.
v. Elasticity of demand for labor in modern employment. private and public.
. viii. Optimal educational strategy, viewed in the light of such projections.
